I. Introduction
When it comes to war, foreign policy bleeds through the legal structure. As Harold Hungju Koh, Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, recently commented, sometimes a policy proposal is "lawful but awful."' A state action may constitute a legal act, but its negative repercussions may outweigh any potential benefit derived from following that course of action. Prominently, the current controversy over the legality of the U.S. drone attacks employed by military in Afghanistan brings this gritty truth to light. A close examination of international humanitarian law (IHL) reveals that the targeted use of drone attacks is a legal means of warfare in the territory of an armed conflict, when used against legal targets. Level targets include terrorists (both those involved long-term under the continuous combat function paradigm (CCF), as well as those briefly engaged in conflict under the paradigm of direct participation in hostilities (DPH). Yet employing drones as a policy of war may not always be good policy. This odd tension lies primarily in the lack of transparency, safeguards, and accountability in the U.S. targeting process, as highlighted by recent scholarship. 2 In the following paragraphs, the legal and military history of the current conflict in Afghanistan is examined at length, followed by an analysis of the current policy regarding use of targeted drone attacks under the Obama administration. The discussion concludes with an overview of specific steps the U.S. can take to clear the legal gap in its current policy. This paper intends to bring together analysis on this issue in a new way which will stimulate a more informed discussion on the U.S. policy of targeted killings in Afghanistan, and to serve as a point of departure on the policy of targeted killing more generally.
A. Factual History of the Conflict
While the U.S. has been fighting al-Qa'ida and its networks for over fifteen years, 3 
The Taliban
The Taliban is a Sunni Islamist group currently centered in Pashtun and Pakistan. 18 It controlled Afghanistan from 1996 until the U.S. invasion in 2001. 19 Its senior leader is Mullah Muhammed Omar. 20 The recently created Council of United Mujahedeen, 21 initiated by the Mullah, brings together the top Taliban leadership in an avowed fight against the American presence in Afghanistan. 22 Currently, it provides part of the base of insurgency in Afghanistan, although in October 2010 its leadership began to warm to the idea of negotiations with the current Afghani government and its supporting allies. 
Al-Qa'ida
Al-Qa'ida is a multinational organization with the capability of "chameleon-like maneuvering." 24 This ability is the result of "a vertical leadership structure that provides strategic direction and tactical support to its horizontal network of compartmentalized cells and associate organizations." 25 Osama bin Laden operated as Emir General. 26 Because of its international nature, pinpointing Al-Qa'ida's location is an absurd task. However, its leadership appears to be concentrated in Waziristan in northern Pakistan. 7 This widely accepted rumor is further affirmed by the intensity of recent CIA drone strikes in this area.
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C. The Weapon and the Method: Unmanned Drones Engaged in Targeted Killing
Drones are used for surveillance and for the elimination of targets. 29 
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HeinOnline --9 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 380 2011 an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator."
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Drones are employed extensively as a weapon for targeted killing by the U.S. military, and "[m]ore than forty countries now have such technology." Those opposing the use of drones (particularly unmanned ones) do so on humanitarian grounds, fearing that such drones "make[] violence too easy to undertake."
32 However, the opposite may be more likely: Unmanned drones provide a precise method for discriminating between the civilian population and the lawful target, thus decreasing the overall casualties of an attack. 3 3 Legally speaking, the difference between employing an unmanned drone in an act of targeted killing instead of a more traditional weapon (such as a gun or helicopter) is negligible.
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II. Legality of Targeted Killing Generally Under Domestic and International Law
A. Under Domestic Law
The United States has a complex and somewhat sordid history of targeted killing. After the Roosevelt Corollary redefined the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. found itself acting politically and militarily in conflicts to which it was not officially a party.
3 5 For example, the U.S. 
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A change of heart, or at least of official policy, came about when the Ford administration renounced assassination in an Executive Order (EO). 40 The Reagan administration's reiteration of this renunciation, spelled out in EO 12333, has continued in force.
EO 12333
prohibits the use of assassination by anyone employed by or working on behalf of the U.S. government. "Assassination" is defined to include three elements: (1) the murder of a private person (2) carried out covertly (3) for political ends.
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However, targeted killing in a time of armed conflict is not an assassination, and is therefore permissible domestic policy. 43 The 
B. Under International Law
Under international humanitarian law (lHL), targeted killing is legal during a noninternational armed conflict where the target is a combatant, a fighter, or a civilian directly participating in hostilities. 49 Essentially, this definition involves two main determinations:
(1) the nature of the conflict, and (2) the nature of the targets of the killings. As analyzed below, the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan functions as a non-international armed conflict, and consequently the targeted killing, by any party, of combatants, fighters, or civilians directly participating in hostilities is legal under the IHL paradigm.so
Nature of the Conflict
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court defines non-international armed conflicts as "armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or 54 The Taliban and alQa'ida qualify as organized armed groups under the paradigm developed by Philip Alston in his Addendum to the Report, which reflects principles of treaty law. 55 Alston mentions three criteria for determining whether a non-State group qualifies as an organized armed group: (1) minimal level of organization; (2) adequate command structure; and (3) collective, armed, anti-government action.
5 6 He relies heavily on Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II in developing this list.
5 7
As noted supra in Part L.B., both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida maintain a minimal level of organization. Both have identifiable leadership: Muhammed Omar and Osama bin Laden's closest officials, respectively, along with their underling commanders.
5 8 The Taliban's command structure seems to hinge on its leader and the Council of United Mujahedeen, while al-Qa'ida is run by the structure of vertical leadership established by bin Laden. Both groups continue to use armed violence to resist the NATO forces in Afghanistan. 60 At least the Taliban also fights against the Afghani government, as evidenced in the violence it demonstrated around the September 2010 parliamentary elections.
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Since both the Taliban and al-Qa'ida meet a minimal level of organization, rely on a form of command structure, and are engaged in armed conflict against a State party, they qualify as non-State armed groups. They continue to engage in armed conflict on Afghan territory against the Afghan government and its allies. Given this status, the current situation in Afghanistan satisfies the Rome Statute definition of non-international armed conflict.
Nature of the Targets
The situation in Afghanistan is a non-international armed conflict. What, then, is the status of the targets of the killings executed via drones? This question boils down to whether 
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the Taliban and al-Qa'ida terrorists qualify as armed forces or civilians directly participating in the hostilities (DPH). Under the following analysis, it is likely that the leaders of both organizations qualify as members of armed groups (CCF), while its operators definitely satisfy the criteria as DPH and may even qualify as members of armed forces (CCF) in certain instances. "The protection of civilians is one of the main goals of international humanitarian law."
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Civilians are never to be targeted for attack. 63 Proportionality and distinction are the "meta-issues" of international humanitarian law. 64 Proportionality is the idea that the force used must not exceed the degree of force necessary to fulfill the military objective, keeping in mind the risk of collateral damage. 65 Distinction requires military operations to distinguish between combatants, who may be lawfully targeted for attack, and civilians, who may not.
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However, the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol spend little time discussing non-international armed conflicts such as the one in Afghanistan, and do not mention these two characteristics where they do. 6 7 Proportionality is assumed in armed conflicts generally. 68 Despite the lack of direct language in treaty law, then, three categories of persons exist in situations of non-international armed conflict: State armed forces, organized non-State armed groups, and civilians. 72 Civilians are always protected under IHL, although they lose their protection and become legal targets of attack via direct participation in hostilities.
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ISAF and Afghani troops, as members of the armed forces of the State parties to the conflict in Afghanistan, qualify as legal targets of attack. Taliban and al-Qa'ida terrorists, however, do not fit nicely into a category without a fact-based analysis. In order for the targeted killings via drones to be legal under IHL, these terrorists must be demonstrated to be either members of organized non-State armed groups (CCF), or civilians directly participating in hostilities (DPH). 74 The benefit of determining that an enemy is CCF is that the individual can then be legally targeted for attack at any time, while those who satisfy DPH alone can only be attacked during the duration of their participation. (1) lasting integration (2) into the part of the armed group that actually uses arms against the State party (3) in the violence of an armed conflict. certainly command those who do, similar to the role of a general in the U.S. Army. The violence which they command is an integral part of the armed conflict in Afghanistan. Given these characteristics, the leadership of both groups qualifies as members of armed groups under the ICRC guidelines. Additionally, should intelligence on the ground reveal that lesser-level terrorists are engaged to the level specified by the ICRC, these terrorists may be qualified as CCF.
ii. Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH) 79 Civilians engaged directly in the hostilities of an armed conflict lose their protected status and become legal targets of attack for the duration of their participation. 80 Terrorists who carry out the orders of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida leadership satisfy the criteria for DPH and become legal targets of attack. Even if they do not qualify as CCF, individuals carrying out attacks in the name of alQa'ida or the Taliban qualify as legitimate targets under this paradigm. There are three elements in determining whether or not a target qualifies as a legitimate target under the direct participation in hostilities framework. The elements include:
(a) a threshold of harm, (b) direct causation between the harm and the intended act, and (c) a belligerent nexus linking the act to the parties of the conflict. 
a. Threshold of Harm
The threshold of harm element requires that the act be directed at the destruction of either the military property of one of the parties of the armed conflict, or at the infliction of harm on the persons or property of civilians or those otherwise protected from direct attack. 82 Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives attacking either NATO or Afghani security forces, or targeting civilians, meet this first element.
b. Direct Causal Link
The second element looks for a direct link between the harm caused by the act, and the act itself.
3 That is, the harm must be intended to be the direct effect of the act. Economic sanctions or the development of a network that could impose harm on a party to the armed 79. While this paper treats the ICRC Guidelines as hard and fast rules for determining DPH, in reality this is not true. conflict do not qualify as "direct" acts. 84 Acts of Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives such as armed attacks on NATO troops or civilians qualify as direct attacks, while the mere existence of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida networks does not.
c. Belligerent Nexus
Last, the act must be carried out with a belligerent nexus. 85 This requirement means that the act must be intended to benefit one party to the armed conflict, to the detriment of another party. 86 The act cannot be a demonstration of mere thoughtless violence. The planned attacks of the Taliban and al-Qa'ida meet this requirement, as they usually entail an element of intention. For example, the Taliban intended to discourage support for NATO and the current Afghani government by threatening violence around the recent elections.
8 7
Taliban and al-Qa'ida operatives who take part in acts against NATO and Afghani security forces qualify as legitimate targets under DPH, even if they do not qualify as CCF. Consequently, they are legitimate targets of direct attack during the time in which they are preparing for or participating in the qualifying act.
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III. Policy: The Need for Systematic Target Selection Procedures Regarding the Use of Targeted Drone Attacks
The heart of the debate over the legality of targeted drone attacks concerns policy considerations. Under both domestic and international law, the use of targeted killing of legal targets is permissible. However, is it good policy? 89 And, more urgently, do the targeted killings carried out by the U.S. actually qualify as legal killings? The answer to both questions is a disappointingly vague "maybe." The definition of good policy is inherently a fact-driven and opinion-based determination. As to the second question, like the notorious three monkeys, the U.S. government seems to have engaged in a "see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil" policy strategy regarding the use of drones. This is particularly true of its Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which, until recently, did not officially recognize its drone program, yet employs it extensively to eliminate terrorist targets in northern Pakistan. 90 It is no secret that the U.S. relies on drones in its war strategy against the insurgency in Note that since the CIA is not technically a branch of the armed forces, the CIA's use of targeted killing involves further legal analysis which will not be addressed in this paper. However, its position on the use of targeted killing affects the policy and public debate elements of targeted killing generally.
Afghanistan.
9 1 Yet the administration repeatedly refuses to produce publicly any guidelines that would set forth the procedures and safeguards used by U.S. forces in determining the legality of a target. 92 Given the importance of transparency in international rule of law, and its role as a check on executive power, as well as the political legitimacy to be gained by identifying the procedures used in targeting, President Obama's administration has much to gain by being more forthcoming with the procedures engaged to ensure compliance.
A. Is the Use of Targeted Killing Good Policy?
The first issue to be addressed is whether the use of targeted killing via drones is good policy generally. At its best, targeted killing can be justified as good policy insofar as it is a quick, militarily efficient means of eliminating a target with minimal civilian casualties. 9 3 At its worst, targeted killing is a gross violation of right to life by depriving an individual of his or her life without due process of the law, and it aggravates the hostilities instead of alleviating them. 94
The Benefits of Targeted Killing as a Military Strategy
On the positive side, targeted killing-particularly via drones-is an effective military strategy with minimal risk to troops. "The appeal of armed drones is clear: [E] specially in hostile terrain, they permit targeted killings at little to no risk to the State personnel carrying them out, and they can be operated remotely from the home State." 95 In fact, the CIA reportedly operates its drones in Afghanistan and Pakistan from its headquarters in Langley, Virginia. 96 Drone strikes serve the critical function of disrupting terrorist planning.
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They are also "more protective of civilian lives than high aerial bombing or long-range artillery" 9 -an incredibly important aspect of the technology, given that IHL strives to minimize casualties to civilians to a level of absolute zero. 
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The Downsides of Targeted Killing as Military Strategy
However, relying on targeted killing as policy has its costs. Most crucial to the discussion of counter-terrorism is the tendency of targeted killing to alienate the civilian population." The benefits of employing targeted killing via drones are not clear-cut, but they are convincing. While the downsides of drone use urges restraint, it is probably better to use drones than to use heavy artillery or other more intensive military attack strategies. Regardless of the conclusions of analysts in this regard, it is evident that the U.S. executive has relied on drones in the war in Afghanistan, and is likely to continue to rely on drones in its further war on terror generally. Assuming that targeted killing is good policy, should the U.S. publicly comply with IHL standards in its use of targeted killing? Strong policy considerations urge the Obama administration to seriously consider publicizing the procedures employed by the U.S. in determining its targets and the safeguards in place to minimize the abuse of this tactic. 104 At least from an ideological perspective, the objectives of IHL and counter-terrorism are nearly indistinguishable. Counter-terrorism seeks to suppress gross violations of the principle of distinction: The intentional targeting and killing of civilians. From this perspective, then, adherence to IHL is a natural tool of counter-terrorism. In practice, IHL is treated as a hampering force on counter-terrorism, as evidenced by the Bush administration's tactics to avoid the application of the Geneva Conventions.
10 s While any practical pitfalls of adhering to IHL should be addressed frankly by the Obama administration, President Obama could still benefit from recognizing the closely related aims of IHL and counter-terrorism in his rhetoric. 
PHILIP HEYMANN
Procedural Guidelines Necessary to Show the U.S. is Complying, Beyond Mere Affirmations by Politicians
In order to ensure that the United States is complying with its own stated adherence to IHL standards in war, the Obama administration should make public the procedures used in selecting targets of targeted killing. Strong arguments have been made to this effect. As stated scathingly by Philip Alston, "[t]he refusal by States who conduct targeted killings to provide transparency about their policies violates the international legal framework that limits the unlawful use of lethal force against individuals." 1 0 6 His criticism does not stop there: "A lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill." 107 To clarify the U.S. position, Alston recommends disclosing the procedures and safeguards in place to ensure that before each targeted killing is carried out, intelligence is reliable and the intended force is proportionate. 108 He stresses the importance of developing "the criteria for individuals who may be targeted and killed, the existence of any substantive or procedural safeguards to ensure the legality and accuracy of killings, and the existence of accountability methods" in the U.S. war strategy.
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Alston's recommendations find support elsewhere. Philip Heymann and Juliette Kayyem voice similar opinions, based on years of careful research and consultation with counterterrorism and national security experts in both the U.S. and the United Kingdom. 110 They recommend that targeted killing decisions be based on reliable evidence of the necessity of the elimination of the target (including evidence of an absolute lack of alternative methods of elimination), according to procedures developed by the President, submitted to the appropriate subcommittees in Congress, and eventually approved by the Houses." 1 These procedures "should also be made public. The public would be better served by an open and enunciated policy than by the secret and ambiguous policy that the United States seems to now embrace." 1 2
Public Procedures Safeguard Against Unwarranted Expansion of Executive Power
In part, the public would be better served by such public procedures because their publication would serve as a check on executive power.11 3 Alston echoes this concern, noting that executive power is strengthened in situations of armed conflicts. 114 Public discussion on the issue of the legal status of terrorists often conflates means and method analysis with status analysis. 115 This means that many well-meaning citizens are suspicious of targeting individuals, even in times of war, based on a fear that such allowances expand the executive's power beyond what is constitutionally valid. 116 If Obama wants to win over public sentiment in support of targeted killing, he should delineate how this policy does not violate the rights of terrorists-how targeted killing is legal, not just another expansion of executive power similar to Bush's expanded use of torture. Instead of simply trying to ignore the issue, it makes more sense politically for a state to take measures to ensure that it is not breaking laws to which it is bound. 117 No political expediency is served by refusing to publicly identify the steps the military takes to comply with the laws by which it claims to be bound.
The Strategic Role of Public Procedures to the Rule of Law in International Relations
The strategic position of the rule of law in international relations brings urgency to this recommendation to publicize the procedures used in target selection. Recent scholarship highlights the intricate relationship between the rule of law in international relations and counter-terrorism. 118 The general idea is that terrorism is best countered by rule of law both within and between countries because the global nature of terrorism requires international cooperation. 119 As noted by former legal advisor to the State Department William H. Taft, IV, "the world is a dangerous place, perhaps most dangerous for the strongest and most prosperous states because they have the most to lose. For the same reasons we promote the rule of law within states, we need also to promote it among them."
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For the purposes of the analysis here, rule of law in international relations means the adherence to a set of rules above domestic law by cooperating with other sovereigns.1 21 IHL is one of these sets of rules, and adhering to IHL benefits sovereigns themselves because IHL is inherently apolitical, its aim being to preserve the humane treatment of individuals even in times of armed conflict.122
Rule of law is critical to counter-terrorism, and it applies to all nations involved in counter-terrorism-including the United States. In fact, al-Qaeda reportedly lost support in the Muslim world because of its lawless tactics. 123 The U.S. and its allies could capitalize on this 
Due Process Considerations
Some advocates in the field of human rights assert that targeted killing denies individuals due process. 134 However, due process does not require that each target be given the opportunity to defend him or herself before a legitimate judicial authority before being eliminated: "[A] state that is engaged in an armed conflict or in legitimate self-defense is not required to provide targets with legal process before the state may use lethal force." 135 Still, in non-international armed conflicts such as the situation in Afghanistan, a target is not lawful until it has qualified as such under either CCF or DPH. 136 Without public disclosure of the procedures for enforcing compliance with applicable law, it is impossible to determine whether or not the government is adhering to the requirements of law. Making public the procedures for target selection may be the most effective means to confront the human right challenges to targeted killing. In particular, if the U.S. wants to keep the higher moral ground, it should afford the public the process of clear, systematic target selection procedures to minimize the risk of targeting an unlawful target (i.e., a civilian), and thereby invoking guilt for a war crime under the Rome Statute.
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Insufficiencies of Current Public Knowledge
Currently, publicly available disclosures on the procedures surrounding targeted killing are disappointingly vague, despite the administration's insistence that the U.S. is in compliance with its obligations under international law. According to Koh, current legal advisor to the State Department, the United States' "general approach" to determining membership in al-Qa'ida and Taliban "is consistent with the approach taken in the targeting context by the ICRC in its recent study on Direct Participation in Hostilities (DPH 
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i. The COIN Manual U.S. forces in Afghanistan rely in part on the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) manual for regulations on how to confront the conflict on the ground. 140 The COIN manual, employed by easy for a government to claim to adhere to certain international laws, and much more difficult for a government to actually prove itself in this regard. The Obama administration obviously has benign intentions when it comes to the implementation of international humanitarian law. A public elucidation of the procedures used by government actors in deciding whether a target satisfies the requisite standards of international humanitarian law would bolster the administration's legitimacy by matching words with actions. The current COIN manual and joint Doctrine are guidelines which encourage adherence to IHL, but they fail to spell out how commanders should apply IHL. In fact, they both lack any explanation of what IHL even requires when it comes to determining whether a target is legitimate. But such explanations of the standards are necessary. Otherwise, the public does not have a measure by which to judge whether the standards the executive claims to abide by are being met.
Self-Defense is Not the Appropriate Paradigm for Targeted Killing
Critics of the continued reliance on IHL as the appropriate international law paradigm in the war against terrorism insist that IHL has "the deleterious effect of deforming the laws of war .
1.5. 1st In particular, requiring that targets first meet IHL standards for legitimate targets before lethal force is applied cripples a state's ability to effectively counter real and urgent threats to national security. 152 When it comes to targeted killing, instead of relying on outdated IHL standards, the United States is encouraged to rely on its domestic law and the right to self-defense, as recognized by the Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.1s 3 In this way, "as long as a targeted killing legitimately meets the legal criteria of self-defense, it can be lawful to target people who might not be, under the strict law of IHL armed conflict, combatants."1 54
i. Jus ad Bellum IJus in Bello Conflation
The fundamental flaw of this argument is its inherent conflation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.'ss It presupposes that a public adherence to IHL (the codification of jus in bello) will compromise a state's flexibility to resort to lethal force under jus ad bellum. This presumption is mistaken. 156 Moreover, advocating the reliance on the right to self-defense as the legal basis for targeted killing endangers international relations by removing a crucial component of accountability, since eradicating the jus in bello component of the duality erases a state's ability to criticize a use of force apart from the justifications for resorting to force in the first place.1 57 Under the duality of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, criticism of a
